Determination of Credit Programme Participation and Socioeconomic
      Characteristics of Beneficiaries: Evidence from Sargodha by Rizwana Shah, Syeda et al.
The Pakistan Development Review 
47 : 4 Part II (Winter 2008) pp. 947–959     
Determination of Credit Programme Participation and 
Socioeconomic Characteristics of Beneficiaries: 
Evidence from Sargodha   
SYEDA RIZWANA SHAH, AQSA TABASSAM BUKHARI, 
AMARA AMJAD HASHMI, and  SOFIA ANWER*  
1.  INTRODUCTION 
International literature asserts that “micro-finance” began alleviating poverty 
several decades ago when organisation in Latin America, Bangladesh, and other 
developing nations started testing the notions of lending small amounts to impoverished 
people (mostly women). Professor Mohammad Younis1 of Bangladesh and his Grameen 
Bank brought it on to the world stage and showed how effectively it could be used to 
change lives. Giving loans of as little as five dollars, Grameen brought millions in to the 
micro credit net and in doing so lifted people, particularly the rural poor, out of abject 
poverty [Ayesha (2007)]. By 1980, the success of such institutions prompted many 
NGO’s and International Organisations to provide micro-finance services.  
Microfinance in Pakistan 
In Pakistan, the First Microfinance Bank was instituted with the conversion of the 
microfinance department of Agha Khan Rural Support Programme. Later on “Khushhali 
Bank and Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF)” were establish. The First Women’s 
Bank was also active in lending microfinance. In NWFP, The Bank of Khyber 
collaborated with NGO’s and Rural Support Programmes (RSPs) to serve lower income 
groups. Many other RSPs having largest coverage represent the number of MFIs which 
function properly their due responsibility in the development of microfinance institutions 
in Pakistan. The Kashf Foundation, Taraqee and Damen have specialised in 
microfinance. The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) developed an individual lending 
programme modified to urban slums, by targeting small entrepreneurs in Karachi region. 
Irrespective of this fact that all these institutions have made many achievements their 
contribution remains not more by five out of hundred of the predicted needy individuals 
[Montgomery (2005)].  
The access to microfinance establishments and other countryside associations 
offering monetary services was inadequate due to a tampered institutional groundwork.2  
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So the credit necessities of mass underprivileged were pleased by unofficial credit 
markets.  
The purpose of this study is to identify the factors that influence the household 
access3 to credit and determine the household to be a programme participant.4  
Objectives 
The underlying objectives of the study are to: 
(1) Study the socioeconomic characteristics of micro credit beneficiaries. 
(2) Determine the factors influencing household participation in credit Programme.  
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The slogan “micro credit” was well known in third world and modern world 
economies, in the end of 20th century. It is one of the very important poverty reduction 
device for very poor in general and particularly for women. The financial organisations 
were disable to provide loan to the poorest possessing no “collateral”. Due to limited 
access of poor to the institutional credit, the impact of credit on small farmers has been 
much below the expectations of policy makers [Qureshi (1995)]. The lack of credit 
opportunities kept the poor in a vicious circle of poverty. The availability of microfinance 
seems imperative because financial markets were prone to neglect the requirements of 
needy households, simply because of the existing criteria in which financial worthiness 
requiring contacts, collateral and accessibility [Kashf (1996)].5 MFIs challenged to defeat 
such hurdles via inventive procedures like, to lend to more people together and standard 
discounts proposals. In addition to this, it set up stronger linkages among customers and 
officials [Montgomery (2005)]. 
During 1990s, micro credit sector remained busy in providing lending chance to 
individuals embarrassed by the formal financial institutions [Black and Morgan (1999)]. 
Simultaneously, new economic improvements lesser the overheads of generating funds. 
These give confidence to credit providers to engage other individuals that were marginal 
and offered additional loan. Yet the fraction of households that were constrained did not 
alter as time goes on [Fissel and Jappelli (1990)]. Atieno (2001) and Fredrick, et al. 
(2004) contradict the above situation and argued that loan was available at rate of interest 
settled by the market. Sustainable financial institutions offer credit not only for 
agricultural production, but also for consumption smoothing and income diversification. 
The rural financial services make available their loan conveniences for “small and micro 
enterprises” and households. However, there are upper edges which have to face by all 
probable clients. It is due to the incomplete know-how among suppliers and demanders. 
The availability of loans was directly affected by the household characteristics [Okurut 
(2004); Diagne and Zeller (2001)]. Access to credit can considerably add to the capability 
of poor household with fewer reserves to get required farm inputs. Access to credit also 
lessen the prospective costs of capital-intensive possessions relative to family labour, thus  
3A household had access to credit from a particular source if it was able to borrow from that source. 
4Participation in the credit programs referred to the situation in which household actually borrowed 
from that source of credit. 
5Annual report Kashif Foundation (1996). 
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cheering labour-saving equipments and lifting labour efficiency, a key issue for growth, 
particularly in many African countries [Delgado (1995); Zeller, et al. (1997)]. A non-
participating household that having access to credit will still beneficial on the grounds of 
awareness that increased its ability to put up with risk, as it can be encouraged to 
experiment with riskier, but potentially high-yielding technology [Eswaran and Kotwal 
(1990)].  
However, it is not necessary that availability of loan to poor individuals forever 
leads to effective measures taken to lesser poverty. Small landholder farmers were too 
poor to take advantage of funds. Although if they approach to credit, its restraints were so 
harsh that increased yield would fail to undertake their feeding requirements. For 
reducing market imperfections and malfunctions credit accessibility to needy seemed to 
be a significant device. The reason behind this was that if for sometime the credit 
restraints were made hassle free, the concerned individuals may employ more labourers 
for getting increase in produce [Simtowe (2006)]. 
There are two different facets of informal financial institutions. Initially, private 
lending bodies and other unofficial commission agents are present with official lenders, for 
example banks and NGO’s, and in recent times, MFI’s. Next, probable loan takers apparently 
experience substantial contract overheads on getting peripheral loan [Gine (2002)].  
There were two different steps in the course of action involved in credit. First, 
people willing to borrow fix on their required amounts to apply for, from a particular 
agency/lender at the existing rate of interest, making demand side. In the next step lender 
decides to whom he had to fund and how much? It was the supply side. The availability 
of both institutional and non institutional credit was predicted through correlations among 
suppliers and demanders. The access to formal credit sector was constrained due to the 
institutional limitations. The institutions sanctioned credit only for reproduction or 
manufacturing, where as non institutional sources offerings were varied. The formal 
lenders adopt severe collateral pre requisites to minimise evasion, thus separating poor 
from the process. The low level of returns, asset growth and limited formal lending for 
consumption smoothening, make the poor household unattractive and render a high-risk 
contour for formal lenders. So they move to the informal credit market to meet their 
credit demands [Duong, et al. (2002); Pal (2002); Barslund and Tarp (2007)]. Credit 
demand is moderately modeled by unique characteristics of borrowers .It was possible 
that most who seek credit would be able to obtain it, but costs and conditions may be 
prohibitive for some high risk borrowers [Atieno (2001); Okurut, et al. (2004)]. The 
demand for credit increased if household’s earnings were more, if it is the owner of the 
house .In case of bigger families demand also raised. Individual’s socioeconomic aspects 
have an effect on its stipulated employment for liquidity restrained “households”.  Where 
as these socioeconomic factors exhibited no influence as for unconstrained individuals 
are concerned. For reducing market imperfection and malfunctions, credit accessibility to 
needy seemed to be a significant device. The reason behind this was that if for sometime 
the credit restraints were made hassle free. The concerned individual may employ more 
labourers for getting increase in produce [Simtowe (2006)]. Household borrowing was 
determined in the long run by real spending, gross wealth and the repayment term for 
outstanding credits, which had a positive influence, and these were inversely related to 
the cost of loans and the unemployment rate. Development in the short run was 
Shah, Bukhari, Hashmi, and Anwer  950
influenced by changes in long-term interest rates and in employment [Nieto (2007)]. The 
household aged between  20 to 30 are more passionate .They continue taking on risk and 
hence experienced rapid increase in earnings. These energetic households actively take 
part in borrowing programmes than elder [Lehnert (2004)].  
Once a household decides to utilise a particular source of loan, the next question will 
be the determination of interest rates [Ho (2004)]. The dominance of doubling of rates of 
interest in the non institutional sector was confusing [Gill (2003)]. In the same area, on 
superficially similar loan transactions, rates of interest may get different standards [Udry 
(1991)], but were frequently to the upper edge [Gill (2003)]. Usually, to reduce evasion and 
risk, higher than normal interest rates were charged as prerequisites .In rural settings of 
Pakistan, the standard deviation of interest rate charged by moneylenders was 40 percent per 
annum [Aleem (1990)]. Evidence from India showed that informal interest rate varied from 
20 percent to 120 percent [Timberg and Aiyar (1984)]. Demand for credit was extremely 
value responsive at higher interest rates. It was also observed that amount of loan was very 
sensitive to alterations in credit developments as compared to rate of interest. This is a 
common practice with households having low earnings [Karlan and Zinman (2005)]. Along 
with increase in rate of interest,  poor’s demand for finance increased with increase in lending 
each year. However, the loan portfolio of financial institutions was shifted towards 
comparatively wealthier customers as compared to the composition of the portfolio that was 
without an interest rate change. The results on one hand supported those who argue that 
raising rates can improve the financial permanence of microfinance organisations. On the 
other side results also supported those who argue that the poor, and particularly the poorest, do 
consider prices and reduced loan demand accordingly [Dehejia, et al. (2005)]. On extra use of 
credit, clients experience an increasing trend in rate of interest .After some time this trend 
become straight and household experience the upper edge of credit. The interest rate assumed 
a wide range of values in informal sector. Sometimes rate of interest was charged in terms to 
under price the collateral [Bhaduri (1973)]. Being able to provide marketable collateral was 
showed an inverse relationship with higher rates of interest [Sarap (1991) and Ho (2004)]. 
Conversely, in economies where there is developed agriculture sectors and landlords and 
middle man hold on informal credit markets, collateral was scarcely under priced. Though the 
rates of interest charged were high. It is due to the reason that households demanded much 
more than was offered by official lenders .They had to move to informal supplier. The 
informal money lenders give loans at very high rates. These landlords and commission agents 
give loans not only for production but also for every reason. They did not documented the 
contracts and do not involve borrowers on paper work. These things make borrowing easy and 
gorgeous [Gill (2003)].  
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
The Data  
The study uses a survey data of rural household collected by the Rural Community 
Development Society (RCDS)6 a Pakistani NGO in the year 2004-05. A sample of 910  
6RCDS, was registered in 1998, a member organisation of Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF). 
The World Bank funded PPAF has been designed to reduce poverty and empower the rural and urban poor in 
Pakistan. RCDS has an exclusive focus on poor farmers and low-income entrepreneurs. 
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from district Sargodha7 was taken from low income category of population with average 
monthly income Rs 3872. The data included but not limited to household characteristics 
including size, composition, employment, expenditures and borrowing.  
Methodology  
The analytical procedures used for the present study can be divided into two 
categories: 
1. Descriptive Analysis.       2.  Econometric Modelling.  
Descriptive Analysis 
The analysis under this category includes calculation and comparison of average 
household characteristics using descriptive statistics. The demographic as well socio-
economic profile of borrowers including information about credit will be examined to 
assess the general characteristic of borrowing households. The descriptive statistics 
analysis will also help provide some insight about the importance of various factors 
related to the use of credit, which in turn will be useful for developing, and estimation of 
the econometric modelling discussed in the following section.    
Econometric Modelling 
In this section, the household decision of borrowing and determinants of 
participation were analysed. Following Ho (2004) and Nguyen (2007) credit programme 
was specified by participation as a function of household characteristics. A twofold 
logistic regression technique was employed to predict the probability of participation. 
With a particular reference of participation to credit, the dependent variable assumed two 
values i.e. “1” if there was participation to credit and “0” otherwise. Numerous mortgages 
taken by individual were supposed as different dealings. The logistic regression model 
then expressed as 
)()()()1(1
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Where “ (y = 1)” indicated the probability of obtaining credit. HAGE narrated the age of 
household head. HEDU was the years of schooling of head of household. HHS was the 
household size. EAR were the number of household family members participating in 
economic activities. INC was the monthly revenue earned by household. INT showed the 
rate of interest charged on loan. The variable OWNH represented the ownership of house. 
It was a categorical variable. Having a house owned by the household equals “1” 
otherwise “0”. SL was the source of loan. It was divided into formal and informal 
financial institutions. FFI showed the presence or absence of formal financial institution 
or NGO operating near the village.  
7The population estimate for the study region, Sargodha Town (2007) is 686,312, for the tehsil 10, 
81,459 and for the district 26, 65,979. The economy of the region is pre-dominantly based on agriculture 
[Pakistan (2007) “Ministry of local Government and Rural Development”. http//www.pap.org.pk]. 
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4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This section provides major characteristics of households that are micro credit 
beneficiaries. Such characteristics include age of household, household size, number of 
dependents and earners, household marital status etc.   
Age of Head of Borrower  Household  
In the sample, the frequency distribution of credit borrowers with respect to their 
age showed that probability of getting initial external financing had increased from the 
age of 28 years and decreased after 50 years. It was at its peak in the age of 35 years. The 
household members below 18 and above 70 were credit rationed. So the financially 
deprived people of these two segments of sample population were not given micro loans. 
It affected mainly the youngest strata of the population, thus depriving them of the 
financial support needed to establish their own businesses (see Table 1).  
Table 1 
General Characteristics of Household Borrowers 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Age (Years) 18 70 40.97 11.142 
Education (Years of Schooling) 0 14 4.10 3.878 
Martial Status 0 1 0.98 0.129 
Family Size 2 12 6.52 2.167 
Earners 1 6 1.40 0.960 
School Going Members 0 6 1.70 1.442 
Learners 1 3 1.27 0.578 
Income (Rs) 1500 12000 3872.77 2346.683 
Expenditures (Rs) 1000 12000 3625.00 1941.136 
Per Capita Income (Rs) 200.00 1666.67 646.2442 400.83380 
Amount Borrowed 2000 40000 21350.00 53089.252 
Days of Process 1 45 3.65 9.279 
 
Education 
The correlation of distribution of education and borrowing activities showed that 
households head’s having no schooling, primary or lower secondary school were the 
main borrowers. The Households’ head possessing university degree did not borrow 
much. The underlying assumption is that higher education surely helped them to find a 
paid job and they were not in need of micro finance. This concludes that higher education 
did not determine credit participation.   
Marital Status and Family Size   
           The households headed by male members have higher probability of obtaining 
loan from either sector. A household leaded by a male family member was expected to be 
professed even economically and consequently lesser hazard, compared to a lady headed 
household. A high dependency ratio tend to boost the danger of loans and accordingly 
left a positive outcome on the interest rate. 
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Income and  Expenditures  of Household 
The explanatory data from the household investigation demonstrates that the 
curriculum mark the poor. The average Income of household Rs 3872.77 was too stumpy 
to carry out his needs. The per capita income Rs 646.2442 was below poverty line in the 
period of data collection (2004-05).That insufficient income trapped the households in to 
a vicious circle of poverty. To break that trap they required a big push, which they 
obtained from external borrowing.  
Household  Occupation 
Descriptive statistics for the occupation of borrowers showed that labour class and 
people enjoying self-businesses were the main borrowers. The percentage from private 
sector, agriculture sector and from live stock comprised of a small proportion of 
borrowers.  
Characteristics of Credit 
Different household decided to apply to the offered sources of credit. The 
applications depend on how these households meet their distinctive and economic 
characteristics. These characteristics determined the judgment to pertain for credit, and to 
which sector it was applied for i.e. either formal or informal lenders.  
The source of credit was divided into formal and informal sector. The result showed 
that majority of loan was given by friends and relatives. It was also observed that friends and 
relatives make available loans for almost all kind of purposes. It ensures the reality that 
informal institutions believe in a lower fudging possibility. So the informal sector is the 
biggest source of loans not in the rural area but also take over in the urban areas. 
Based on the classification of informal markets in the study region, it was seen that 
out of those who had used credit from informal sources, 82 percent used family and 
friends and 5 percent took credit from moneylenders and property owners. The 
proportion of loan from formal sector was 12 percent. It was due to the reason that 
friends and relatives offer loan for every reason and they were best aware of the personal 
characteristics of households. They knew very much about the borrower’s credibility so 
the fudging rates were minimised. The rate of interest was nominal on such loans. 
Perhaps this was the biggest reason of taking loan from this sector.  
Fig. 1.  Source of Credit 
Agriculture Bank
Commercial Bank
Money Lender
Friends and Relatives
Slice 5
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Determinants of Participation in Credit Programme 
In this section, the household participation in credit determined by various factors 
was analysed with Logistic regression analysis. Rural financial institutions provide credit 
both for consumption and production purposes. It was supposed that, on demand of credit 
,an individual either apply to formal or informal institution for loan. The applications 
were made on the chance of obtaining funds from either sector. The probability of getting 
loan depends on the money demanded, the previous loan records and also on the 
available supply. It was assumed that for an individual household “i” for a certain time 
period ”t”, the probability of obtaining loan from any informal institution was greater 
than the formal institution. Following Ho (2004) this assumption was also applied. The 
results were shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Determinants of Households Participation in the Credit Programme 
Variable Coefficients Sig. Odd Ratio’s 
HAGE –0.51 
(0.020) 
0.012 0.950 
HEDU –0.28 
(.033) 
0.387 0.972 
HHS 0.242 
(0.075) 
0.001 1.274 
EAR 0.390 
(0.037) 
0.000 1.477 
INC –1.160 
(0.290) 
0.000 0.314 
INT 1.319 
(0.248) 
0.000 3.740 
OWNH(cat) 0.145 
(0.164) 
0.376 1.156 
SL(cat) –1.631 
(0.361) 
0.000 0.196 
FFI(cat) 1.161 
(0.246) 
0.000 3.192 
constant 5.013 
(0.685) 
0.000 150.339 
Dependent Variable= participation in credit programme (yes=1, 0 otherwise).  
The change in dependent variable was explained by the magnitude of odd ratios. 
The results demonstrated that there was a negative relation ship between the age of 
household and access to credit (which is =1) for a household. It mean, if age of household 
head increase there is a significant decrease in the participation to credit programme.   
The odds ratio for education of head of household showed that it had negative effect on 
the access to credit, that if education increase there is a significant decrease in 
participation to credit programme. 
While the odds ratio for household size revelled that as the no of headcount 
member of household increases there is a significant increase in the participation to credit 
programme  
The odds ratio for earners of household (no of headcount members involved in 
economic activities) was depicting that participation to credit programme for a household 
significantly increases as the earner of household increases.  
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The odd ratio for the income (natural log) of household showed that income 
increases the participation to credit programme decreases. 
The odds ratio for the variable rate of interest (natural log) indicated that 
participation to credit programme significantly increases as rate of interest increases.  
The odds ratio for the dichotomous variable of the ownership of house (if 
household head  owned the house =1, zero otherwise) revealed that odds of the event of 
participation to credit programme of a household head possessing a house significantly 
increases significantly more than  odds of a household  living in a rented house. 
The odds ratio for the binary variable of the source of loan (formal =1 and 2 
otherwise) was showing that odds of the event of participation to credit programme to 
formal source decreases significantly than odds of informal source. 
The odds ratio for the dichotomous variable of the presence of formal financial 
institution (if a formal financial institution or NGO operating in the area =1, zero 
otherwise) was predicting that odds of the event of participation to credit programme of a 
household significantly increases about 3.192 times more than  odds of absence of formal 
financial institution . 
Above results demonstrated that a household demanded more debt when its 
income was higher, when it owned its own home, when the family size was larger and the 
head was working. The age of head of household showed a negative affect on 
participation as younger households are more energetic and motivated. These results are 
consistent with Lehnert (2004) and Nugyen (2007) but it differs with swain (2001) who 
stated that with the increase in age, accumulated experience, practical and professional 
wisdom of the household increased its income generating capability and he demanded 
more credit to explore his capabilities or to spend on consumption.  
Education level also showed a negative affect on credit participation. It is also 
similar to Nugyen (2007). Households heads possessing higher degrees were showing 
almost no participation. Because higher education may help head of households easier to 
find a paid job.   
The variable estimated for the earning members of a household have a positive 
relationship with the access to credit. It was because as the household had more than one 
earner it was easier for him to repay and to fulfill collateral requirement. Households 
having more than one earning members showed economically sound position. 
The coefficient estimate for the household size variable was positive and 
significantly consistent with the previous studies [Ho (2004); Simtowe (2006) and 
Nguyen (2007)]. Having a bigger family, ceteris paribus: increased the demand for loans, 
because per capita income was smaller for big households. A large family was likely to 
expect a large flow of income in the future as the children grow up and begin to work, 
thus they were likely to demand more credit.  
The rate of interest was reported as positive. It meant that households were 
indifferent about the rate of interest. This was consistent with Malik (1999), Gill (2003) 
and Dehejia, et al. (2005). The results supported those who argued that raising rates could 
improve the financial permanence of microfinance organisations. Other things being 
constant, and assuming all borrowers have equally good credit, a lender would prefer to 
lend out a big loan to one borrower rather than several small loans to several borrowers 
had he the choice, because his transaction cost would be lower.  
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The coefficient of income of household was negative and significant. As income 
from both farm and off-farm activities enhance farmers' confidence to not borrow. 
Because we can categorise the observed loan as micro credit or micro financing loans 
which more than 80 percent comes from the informal sector and most often used for the 
consumption purposes or to smooth the consumption patterns in the bad yeas. Where the 
borrowers also belonged to the low income group. Their per capita income was Rs 646 
which was below poverty line in the year of data collection 2004-05. Therefore such 
income reflects capacity to finance their spending by themselves, hence as household 
income increased, the probability to borrow is expected to decrease. 
The existence of the any financial institute or NGO had strongly positive effect on 
the participation activities in the credit programme. The underlying fact is that, if there is 
any financial institute it breaks the monopoly of the land lords and arthies in the credit 
market, especially in the rural areas. It helps to overcome the market imperfection in the 
credit market. 
As most of the loan in our data was taken from informal sources, therefore the 
dummy variable of formal sector showed a negative relation ship with credit participation 
variable. It is showing the fact that more risky and consumption purpose loans are not 
given by financial institutes. 
Over all we can say that the results of the research in hand are in line with general 
established economic theory. It is very reasonable approach to study the determinants of 
household participation in credit programme as a function of household’s socio economic 
characteristics. [See Atieno (2001); Fredrick, et al. (2004); Malik (1999); Dehejia, et al. 
(2005); Ho (2004); Nguyen (2007)].   
5. CONCLUSION 
The paper is an attempt to analyse the factors affecting household participation in 
credit programmes. It utilised a cross-sectional household data set from the period 2004-
2005. The results drawn from the Logistic regression concluded that credit was accessible 
at market determined rates. At household level, the participation to credit was influenced 
by age of the head of household, years of schooling of household head, earners in a 
household and household size. The ownership of house increased the probability of 
obtaining loan. One surprising result was that household was indifferent about rate of 
interest. They prefer liquidity even at high rate of interest. The presence of formal 
financial institution increased the access to credit by household. It was observed that 
major source of external financing was the informal credit market.   
6.  SUGGESTIONS 
To perk up the rural credit markets the following actions are proposed. 
 
The procedure of getting loan should be simplified. So that illiterate can easily 
understand terms and conditions of agreement. 
For the purpose of reimbursement, MFIs should create such incentives that 
would influence borrowers to repay their loans at the given time. 
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MFIs should devise such policies that credit should reach to the low income 
group and women for smoothing consumption and for carrying on income-
generating and income diversifying activities. 
Operating these recommendations can improve the efficiency of the lending 
methods and increase household participation in credit programmes and helped them to 
get out of poverty.   
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Comments    
The paper analyses the determination of Credit Programme Participation and 
Socio-Economic Characteristics of Beneficiaries by using a survey data that was 
collected from 910 rural households in Sargodha by a Pakistani NGO in the year 2004-
05.  The paper needs some revisions. First of all, the introduction and review of literature 
section need to be improved. Review of literature needs to be written with continuity of 
ideas. Furthermore, it is not clear from the review whether the review is reflecting 
evidence from Pakistan or other countries.  
The review suggests that household borrowing is determined in the long run by 
real spending, gross wealth and the repayment terms for outstanding credits.  On the other 
hand household borrowing is inversely related to the cost of loans and the unemployment 
rate. The inverse relationship with unemployment rate is not expected. I anticipate a 
positive relationship the higher the unemployment rate, the higher will be the borrowing 
need of a person. There is also need to review recent literature on microcredit in Pakistan. 
For example, Access to Finance Study carried out by State Bank in collaboration with 
DFID and GTZ. The finding of the study suggests that only 2 percent of the population 
get credit form the formal sector.  
The authors have analysed the data by using the descriptive analysis and 
econometric modeling techniques. The paper needs more editing as the authors have not 
referred tables of results in the discussion and reported in an appendix. They should 
report the results in the main body of the text. In results section, they also discuss 
evidence from Malawi and Kenya confusing them with Pakistan. The result that 
participation to credit program significantly increases as rate of interest increases is 
contrary to the perception and findings from other countries. It should be further 
explained. In the conclusion sections general suggestions have been given. These 
suggestions should be linked with empirical findings of the paper. 
There are too many references in the reference list but a number of references 
referred in the text have not been written. Unnecessary references should be curtailed and 
only relevant references should be included. Comparison of the results with other authors 
should come in a sub section of result.  In the end, author should discuss the theme of the 
conference, the economic sustainability and try to link the paper with theme.    
Talat Anwar 
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